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Consolidated Intelligence Resource Information System (CIRIS) CY 72
Data Call (U)

1. (U) This memorandum responds to your questions of 2 April concerning the pros and cons for DIA of issuing a CY 72 CIRIS data call.
2. (U) CIRIS was designed to present the cost of intelligence resources in relation to their targeted objectives. It does not deal quantitatively with "value" or "effectiveness." CIRIS does, however, express how resources are applied in a quantitative sense. It can respond to a variety of needs of program managers and senior management echelons. Thus, CIRIS is important to any analytic effort within DIA which attempts to relate intelligence costs to targets.
3. (U) In addition, an attempt has been made to better relate CIRIS targets to intelligence priorities and objectives included in Annex A, JSOP. This will make it possible to relate CIRIS costs directly to JSOP priorities and objectives. A powerful management tool could result, which will be of considerable use to you in making resource recommendations in connection with Defense intelligence.
4. (U) To date, CIRIS target-oriented data has proven to be useful in two DIA analytic efforts. The first is the yearly CDIP Review Study under way in DP. In this program, CIRIS target-oriented displays are of considerable value both from the performance and fiscal aspects. Enclosure 1 is an elaboration of the impact of CIRIS on this study and the anticipated effect of having no data call this year. The second effort has taken place within DC, where CIRIS data has been used in development of the Master Collection and Processing Plan. Enclosure 2 is a discussion of the usefulness of CIRIS in this effort. CIRIS data is also used occasionally in normal program review within DP. It is anticipated that the target-oriented CIRIS data base will receive more extensive use in the future as greater effort is made to carry out analytic studies of high-cost problems and relate them to overall priorities.
5. (U) The advantages of CIRIS to DIA are as follows:
 - a. It is the only data system in use today which identifies how much is being spent by target. Thus, the CIRIS data is important if we are to analyze the application of resources against intelligence targets, objectives, and priorities on a DoD-wide basis and consider alternate courses of action.
 - b. Elements at all levels of Defense intelligence are accustomed to using this system of reporting, which has evolved over five years of trial and error.
 - c. CIRIS data will enable DIA to assemble GDIP fact books easily.

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Gen'l Bennett approved this a few days later.

d. DCI computers containing FYDP-based CIRIS data have been adapted to make rapid comparisons by cost category of resource changes from year to year. In addition, these computers can provide a rapid worldwide account of allocation of intelligence resources. Examples of such information are at Enclosures 3 and 4. Where time is essential, CIRIS is the only mechanism that can provide information with a minimum of delay.

c. CIRIS is available to serve as an important element of an intelligence management information system. If it is abandoned, efforts in this direction will have to start from scratch.

6. (U) The disadvantages of CIRIS to DIA are as follows:

a. It is somewhat costly. A recent study indicated that a full CIRIS data call cost DIA approximately \$27,800, and a short call \$190. In CY 71 there was one of each type call.

b. It is recognized that a CIRIS data call will provide considerable visibility of DoD intelligence resources to the DCI, especially in the area of production. In addition, data on CIA and State Department efforts may not always be available to Defense, nor do we understand fully how objective the preparation of NSA CIRIS submissions may be. But, attempts to secure this information can be made through bilateral agreement or through DCI. The conceivable lack of a reciprocal exchange of information could lead to unfair comparisons of intelligence community resources to the detriment of DIA, and perhaps even to the imposition of additional fiscal constraints.

c. CIRIS may result in the DCI's placing primary emphasis on strategic intelligence resources, which are of paramount interest to him. While GDIP tactical intelligence resources may receive greater high-level exposure through CIRIS, their vital importance to Defense intelligence and the command and control structure may be discounted.

7. (U) The recent DCI study on US intelligence production resources you referred to in your 2 April note is a reformatting and statistical summary, with narrative, of CIRIS data for FY 71. It identifies the production resources of the DoD, CIA, and State and shows the targets against which they are arrayed. Although it provides much interesting information, it is not an analytic study which addresses a specific problem, considers alternate courses of action, and makes a policy recommendation. It cannot, therefore, be said to reflect fully the management potential of the CIRIS system.

8. (U) Although the CIRIS system can have a potentially adverse impact on Defense intelligence, it may also bring beneficial results if the data are effectively used by DIA. CIRIS is the key to efficient DIA analysis of DoD-wide intelligence activities and recommendations concerning the use of resources. Even though it is too late for the 1972 CIRIS data call to have

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an impact on this year's GDIP review, failure to issue the call will impede analyses under way within DIA and retard progress in developing a useful management information system. As an alternative, the DoD data call for FY 72 could be canceled and consideration given to a refinement of the system for next year that would show a more equitable display of community-wide resources. The best course of action, however, appears to be DIA participation in CIRIS FY 72.

9. (U) This memorandum has been coordinated with DC and CC.

4 Enclosures

1. The GDIP Review Study (C)
2. The Defense Intelligence Master Collection and Processing Plan (S)
3. CIRIS Data Displays (S)
4. CIRIS Display of Resource Data Allocation (S)

* Bennett approved.

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The CDIP Review Study

1. (C) DP-3D has been tasked to produce a yearly CDIP Review Study. Its results are aimed at the budget year, and analysis is to be available in time for use during the summer's budget review schedule.
2. (C) The Special Studies Branch has found the FY 71 CIRIS target oriented displays to be of considerable value both from the performance and fiscal aspects of this study. In these directions, the FY 71 CIRIS is making two important contributions. First, CIRIS is the only available authoritative source in which to find a common description of how the forces of each FYDP program element are substantively allocated within the Positive Intelligence Mission. Knowledge of the FY 72 CDIP-wide force allocation available in the FY 71 CIRIS has enabled DP-3D (with the help of DE, DI, and DT analysts) to design a performance-oriented data base directed at the level of the FYDP program elements. Second, the fiscal displays which accompany the force allocations are also of value, but in an implicit sense. The dollar distributions shown are not used "per se," but are converted to program element "tasking ratios." These ratios have recently been used to target orient the FY 74 fiscal guidance TOAs.
3. (C) CIRIS is helping DP-3D produce a performance and cost data base applicable to the FY 74 budget year. The analyses of these data are expected to be useful to DIA relative to this summer's PIM issues. The loss of the FY 72 CIRIS will not affect this year's CDIP Review Study because of the lengthy delay already imposed. The impact will be in the forthcoming year. The magnitude will be a function of the extent to which the force allocation and the program element "tasking ratios" developed from the FY 71 CIRIS decay over time. A yearly CIRIS target-oriented data call (or some variant thereof) would certainly be the preferred method of update. If this were not feasible and DR chose to continue the CDIP Review Study, DIA would need to actively coordinate with all other program managers, including DASD(I), to obtain the force allocation and information on which to base revised tasking ratios. The exact degree to which this alternative would affect the timeliness of study output needs further examination. However, since the resources assigned to this project are already thinly spread, the absence of ready-made data such as available from CIRIS is expected to impose a serious restraint.

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The Defense Intelligence Master Collection and Processing Plan

1. (S) At the direction of the command element and in order to improve the management of collection and processing resources, the Defense Intelligence Master Collection and Processing Plan (MCPP) has been developed by DC-3. This plan provides basic direction and guidance for the planning, programming, coordination, management, and tasking of DoD intelligence collection and processing resources and those national-level intelligence resources for which the Secretary of Defense is executive agent.
2. (S) The MCPP identifies the intelligence objective in Part I, Annex A, JSOP, Essential Elements of Information, and gaps against which collection and processing resources are directed and relates resources to them. It outlines the general parameters of the system within which intelligence collection and processing activities under DoD cognizance are conducted, including the manner in which these activities are tasked against intelligence objectives.
3. (S) The cornerstone of the MCPP is the Defense intelligence objectives. The first step in utilizing these objectives for program planning and resource allocation purposes is the determination of the present application of DoD intelligence resources to the intelligence objectives. CIRIS is the only system providing consolidated data on collection resources which shows their application and programmed costs against well-defined countries/area-subject targets. It is being used as the basic source of program data for the MCPP. CIRIS data is also used as the statistical data base for use in the evaluation of collection resources. It makes it possible to weigh individual resources against each other in terms of performance and cost effectiveness based on contribution to accomplishment of intelligence objectives/targets.
4. (S) The MCPP further utilizes CIRIS data by displaying geographically the current tasking of all DoD collection and surveillance resources (processing resources to be added) in terms of magnitude of effort from a cost standpoint against each DoD intelligence objective in matrix form for each major DoD program (GDIP, CCP, and Air Force Special Activities).
5. (S) The only minor limitations to total compatibility between CIRIS data and the MCPP is that CIRIS subject targets still differ slightly from JSOP intelligence objectives, and CIRIS data is not broken down in all cases to individual countries as are the objectives and priorities in the JSOP.
6. (S) While CIRIS in its present configuration does not meet all DC requirements for a basic information source, its data becomes a vital part of the MCPP. Without some form of CIRIS data, the MCPP will lose much of its effectiveness as a resource management tool.

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